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NOTES
OLIPHANT V. SCHLIE: TRIBAL CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION OF NON-INDIANS
Carol A. Mitchell
Surely the power to preserve order on the reservation, when
necessary by punishing those who violate tribal laws, is a sine qua
non of the sovereignty that the Suquamish originally possessed.'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Oliphant v. Schlie2 af-
firmed the denial of a writ of habeas corpus sought by a non-Indian
who alleged that the Suquamish Tribe had no criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians. The Ninth Circuit thus became the highest fed-
eral court to affirm tribal jurisdiction on the basis of the inherent
sovereignty of the tribe. Other recent Supreme Court and lower
federal court decisions finding tribal jurisdiction of non-Indians
have based their findings on express statutory grants .3 This note will
examine the Oliphant decision in light of the tangled history of
criminal jurisdiction over Indian country.
I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
An American Indian tribe is a unique political entity.4 Although
many culturally distinct people have come to America, none enjoy
the special legal relationship of the Indian tribes with the federal
and state governments. This special status derives from their
unique position in the historical development of this country: their
occupation of North America predating European settlement, the
cession of most of that territory to the federal government by treaty,
purchase or conquest, and the reservation by the federal govern-
ment of a fraction of the original Indian holdings for exclusive tribal
use and self-government.5 Since the earliest years of this nation, the
federal and state governments have been trying to define this spe-
cial relationship. The definitions and redefinitions throughout the
years have been marked by pendulous changes, fluctuating between
1. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975); United States v. Finch, 548
F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1976).
4. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.(5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S.(6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
5. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation
Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. lav. 535 (1975).
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opposite goals: on the one hand, sovereignty, self-government and
self-determination, and on the other, assimilation and termination.
Today's complex maze of jurisdictional doctrines is the result.'
This note focuses on tribal criminal jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in
any given case rests upon analysis of the treaties, statutes, or execu-
tive orders applicable to the particular reservation, the general fed-
eral statutes applicable to all Indian reservations, and, in some
instances, a state constitution and statutes.7 However, in order to
assess the significance of Oliphant, this note will survey only the
broader doctrines and statutes, and briefly consider the major policy
variations.
A. Jurisdiction of Intra-Indian Crimes
Traditionally, crimes committed by one Indian against the per-
son or property of another Indian have been within the jurisdiction
of the tribe. Treaties generally recognized this jurisdiction., Con-
gress, as early as 1817,10 excepted intra-Indian offenses from the
general federal jurisdiction exercised over crimes committed in
"Indian country".'1
The first permanent intrusion upon the exclusive jurisdiction of
the tribe over intra-Indian crimes came in 1885 after the United
States Supreme Court, in Ex Parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca (also known
as Crow Dog)I held that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to try
Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca, a Brule Sioux, for the murder of a Brule Sioux
Chief. In reaction to this decision, Congress passed the Federal
Major Crimes Act' 3 which remains in effect today.
The next major change in federal statutes governing Indian
criminal jurisdiction was the enactment of Public Law 280 in 1953.11
6. Lynaugh, Developing Theories of State Jurisdiction Over Indians: The Dominance
of the Preemption Analysis, 38 MONT. L. REV. 63, 64 (1977).
7. Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: The Historical
Perspective, 17 Amz. L. REV. 951, 952 (1975).
8. It is important to understand that this introductory material is only a broad over-
view, and, as such, tends to oversimplify the many problems in this area.
9. Clinton, supra note 7, at 955-56.
10. Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. XCII, §§ 1-2, 3 Stat. 383 (1817) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970)). See p. 342 & note 27 infra.
11. "Indian country" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
12. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
13. The Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1970)). The major crimes over which the federal courts have jurisdiction are: murder;
slaughter; rape; carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife, who has not attained the age
of sixteen years; assault with intent to commit rape; incest; assault with intent to kill; assault
with a dangerous weapon; assault resulting in serious bodily injury; arson; burglary; robbery;
and larceny.
14. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-90 (current version in scattered sections
of titles 18 and 25 of the United States Code (1970) [hereinafter referred to as P.L. 2801.
The General Allotment Act was enacted by Congress in the intervening years and contained
[Vol. 38
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Congress' primary concern in enacting P.L. 280 was the "problem
of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations and the absence of
adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement."'" In P.L. 280,
Congress gave consent to States wishing to assume civil or criminal
jurisdiction, or both, over Indian reservations. 6 No tribal consent
was required,' 7 until the amendment of P.L. 280 by the Civil Rights
Act of 1968.11 The Civil Rights Act also provided a method by which
States could retrocede any jurisdiction previously assumed under
P.L. 280.'" In addition to amending P.L. 280, those sections of the
Act known as the Indian Civil Rights Act extended certain constitu-
tional protections to prosecutions in tribal courts. 0 Although the
Act limited punishments which the tribal courts may impose to a
maximum of six months imprisonment, a $500 fine, or both," it did
not expressly limit the crimes cognizable in tribal court.
In summary, on reservations where the State has not assumed
complete criminal jurisdiction under P.L. 280, if the offender and
the victim are both Indian, the federal government has exclusive
jurisdiction only if the offense is covered by the Federal Major
Crimes Act. Otherwise, the tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction,
but are limited in the sentences they may impose.
provisions affecting criminal jurisdiction; however, this policy was reversed in 1934. Because
the continuing effect of this statute is minimal in this area of jurisdiction, it is not discussed
in the text at this point.
15. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379 (1976); Goldberg, supra note 5, at 541-
42.
16. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, §§ 6-7, 67 Stat. 588 (current version at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1321-22 (1970)). Section 2 of the Act granted certain States complete jurisdiction
over most or all of the reservations within the State. Most States, however, were simply given
the option to assume such jurisdiction. Montana was one such State, and she chose to assume
limited jurisdiction over only one reservation, The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Reser-
vation. See REvISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947), §§ 83-801 to 807; State ex rel. McDonald, 159
Mont. 156 (1972).
17. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1326 (1970). However, many States required some form of tribal
consent. See, e.g., REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947), § 83-802.
18. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-289, 82 Stat. 77-78 (pertinent provisions codi-
fied at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03, 1321-26 (1970)).
19. 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (1970).
20. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970). Generally, the constitutional protections which are ex-
tended include those of the fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments. The Indian Bill of
Rights was necessary because previous cases had held that constitutional guarantees were not
applicable to tribal proceedings. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). But cf.
Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965), a case arising out of the Fort Belknap
Reservation in Montana.
21. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
22. Whether a tribal court can convict a person of an offense which traditionally has
been considered a felony, but which is not one of the "Major Crimes", and limit the sentence
imposed to 6 months or a $500 fine, has not yet been answered in any court.
3
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B. Jurisdiction of Crimes By or Against Indians
With the exception of some pre-1800 treaties,23 the policies of
the federal government regarding jurisdiction of offenses commited
by a non-Indian against an Indian, and by an Indian against a non-
Indian, remained basically the same until 1953.24 Congress first set
forth this policy in section 4 of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act
of 1802.25 This section was reenacted in 1817 when exceptions to
federal jurisdiction were enumerated.2 6 With minor changes, the
provisions of the 1817 Act are codified today at 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(1970), which reads:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general
laws of the United States as to the punishments of offenses com-
mitted in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the
Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one
Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any
Indian committing any offenses in the Indian country who has
been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where,
by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses
is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.Y
This section, known today as the General Crimes Act, recognizes the
jurisdiction of the tribe over an offense committed by an Indian.
The statute extends federal jurisdiction to a non-Indian who com-
mits a crime against an Indian in Indian country. The United States
Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the exclusive federal juris-
diction of offenses against Indians.5
In 1959, in the landmark case of Williams v. Lee,29 the Supreme
Court, in dicta, spoke to this area of jurisdiction:
23. See, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokees, July 2, 1791, art. X, 7 Stat. 40; Treaty with
the Creeks, Aug. 7, 1790, art. VIII, 7 Stat. 37. These and other treaties may be found in INDIAN
TREATIES, 1778-1883 (C. Kappler ed. 1972).
24. Ex Parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca (otherwise known as Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556, 571
(1883); Donnelley v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 271 (1913). However, the General Allotment
Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-58 (1970)), had provided for
bringing Indians who received allotments under State jurisdiction. Because the allotment
policy was reversed in 1934, the net impact "was not substantial in shifting authority to the
states." Clinton, supra note 7, at 966-67.
25. Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. XIII, 2 Stat. 139.
26. The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. XCII, §§ 1-2, 3 Stat. 383 (1817) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970)). This statute has come to be known as the General Crimes
Act.
27. The constitutionality of this statute was upheld as a proper exercise of the power
vested in Congress by the commerce clause in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
28. See, e.g., Donnelley v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913); Williams v. United
States, 327 U.S. 711 (1946); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
29. 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
[Vol. 38
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[If the crime was by or against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or
that expressly conferred on other courts by Congress has remained
exclusive.30
The Court's footnote to this statement is helpful. After referring to
the Federal Major Crimes Act as one congressional grant of
jurisdiction over reservations to the federal courts, the Court stated:
"[Nlon-Indians committing crimes against Indians are now gener-
ally tried in federal courts."' 3' This generalization is substantiated
by the fact that there is only one reported case dealing with an
attempt by an Indian court to exercise jurisdiction over a non-
Indian. In Ex Parte Kenyon, 32 a non-Indian sought a writ of habeas
corpus from a federal district court. The court found no tribal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction because the crime was not committed on the
reservation.3 3 In dicta, the Kenyon decision also said that the Gen-
eral Crimes Act deprived the Indian tribes of jurisdiction over non-
Indians." This issue was not directly raised again in any reported
case until Oliphant.3 1
C. Jurisdiction of Crimes Between Non-Indians
Jurisdiction of crimes committed by non-Indians against non-
Indians within the boundaries of Indian territory has changed mark-
edly since the adoption of the first federal policies. Many pre-1800
treaties, written in language of international diplomacy, dealt with
Indian tribes as sovereign powers, and thus recognized the tribe's
jurisdiction over non-Indians who committed crimes within Indian
territory. 36 However, some of these early treaties, and most later
ones, dealt with criminal jurisdiction on the basis of the offender's
citizenship: the federal government assuming jurisdiction over
American citizens within Indian territory and the tribes retaining
jurisdiction over their own members.3 7 This policy of federal juris-
diction over non-Indians committing crimes in Indian territory was
formalized, as indicated above, in the series of Indian Trade and
Intercourse Acts enacted in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.
In 1831 and 1832, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue
of jurisdiction in Indian country in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia3 8 and
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 14 F. Cas. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7,720).
33. Id. at 355.
34. Id.
35. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976).
36. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 7, at 953.
37. Id. As noted in the Clinton article, this approach was not entirely foreign to interna-
tional diplomacy. Cf. Treaty with China, July 3, 1844, art.XXI, 8 Stat. 596.
38. 30 U.S.(5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
19771
5
Mitchell: Oliphant v. Schlie: Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Of Non-Indians
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1977
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Worcester v. Georgia.39 The Worcester case involved the assertion of
state criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian residing in Indian
country. In these landmark cases, Chief Justice Marshall laid two
of the cornerstones of Indian law. First, he forcefully asserted the
federal government's exclusive jurisdiction over Indian affairs, rea-
soning that under the Constitution, Congress' power was plenary
and the States were without jurisdiction. 0 Secondly, he character-
ized the Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations"" with pow-
ers of self-government which retained those original powers not re-
linquished by the tribe to the federal government. 2 Subsequent
federal legislation has altered the latter characterization by signifi-
cantly limiting the powers of the tribes." The Supreme Court has
sanctioned this unilateral assumption of power" and has character-
ized the powers retained by the tribe as those powers not limited
by Congress. 5
Despite the earlier Marshall opinions and ample federal legisla-
tion specifying exclusive federal jurisdiction, in 1881 the Court held,
in United States v. McBratney,6 that the State of Colorado had
jurisdiction to try a non-Indian for the murder of another non-
Indian within the boundaries of the Ute Reservation. This case has
come to stand for the rule that state courts have jurisdiction of
offenses committed by non-Indians against non-Indians within In-
dian country. 7 Congress has neither explicitly authorized such
jurisdiction, 8 nor explicitly negated it by rejecting the holdings of
the McBratney line of cases. Although the McBratney decision re-
39. 31 U.S.(6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
40. Id. at 539-40.
41. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.(5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
42. Id. at 56.
43. The Federal Major Crimes Act is an example of Congress' unilateral action which
infringed upon tribal sovereignty and abrogated prior treaty agreements. See Clinton, supra
note 7, at 972-73, for a rationalization of broken treaties.
44. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
45. United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 605-06 (1916). See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217 (1959).
46. 104 U.S. 621 (1881). Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896), completes the
rationale of McBratney by extending the McBratney rule to a State, Montana, which had
disclaimed all jurisdiction over Indian reservations within its borders in its state constitution.
Id. at 247. Unlike Montana, Colorado, the State involved in McBratney, had no such dis-
claimer.
47. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S.
496, 499 (1946).
48. P.L. 280, of course, authorizes States to assume criminal jurisdiction of reserva-
tions, but no federal statute specifically authorizes the States to assume jurisdiction of non-
Indians only. Under P.L. 280, the state legislatures must affirmatively act in order to assume
such jurisdiction. See 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (1970). The McBratney-Draper line of authority pre-
dated P.L. 280 and required no affirmative state action.
[Vol. 38
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mains, in the words of one commentator, "enigmatic", 49 it is valid
law today and States do exercise criminal jurisdiction over offenses
committed between non-Indians on reservations.
D. Changes in Federal Indian Policy
The unexplained contradiction between McBratney and the
previous Marshall decisions exemplifies the pendulous and often
contradictory fluctuations in federal Indian policy. Congressional
policy had changed between the 1830's, when the Marshall opinions
were written, and the 1880's when the McBratney decision was ren-
dered. In 1834, just two years after the Marshall decisions, Congress
reaffirmed those decisions by reenacting section 4 of the Indian
Trade and Intercourse Act, which provided for exclusive federal
jurisdiction over Indian country. Federal jurisdiction, rather than
state jurisdiction, was logical in light of the then prevailing United
States policy of relocating Indian tribes to unsettled territory west
of the Mississippi River - outside the boundaries of the States. By
the 1880's, as a result of westward expansion, most of the States
west of the Mississippi were admitted to the Union. Congress could
no longer relocate Indian tribes to lands distant from white settle-
ment. The lands reserved for Indian use were necessarily located
within state borders, adjacent to lands occupied by non-Indians.
The small tracts so reserved did not allow most Indian tribes to
continue their traditional way of life with its independent economy.
Congress responded in 1887 by passing the General Allotment Act.5"
The goal of this Act was the eventual assimilation of the Indian into
the American economic system. The Act specifically provided for
the individual Indian to eventually come under state jurisdiction.,
McBratney, in providing for the extension of state jurisdiction over
non-Indians within Indian country, was consonant with this policy
of termination of reservations and expanded state jurisdiction.
The General Allotment Act of 1887 remained the federal policy
until 1934. It authorized the allotment of reservation lands in 80 or
160 acre tracts to individual Indians who ultimately were to take
title in fee simple. The excess lands within the exterior boundaries
of the reservations, not allotted to tribal members, could be opened
to non-members for homesteading. 5 Many non-Indians settled on
those reservations either by homesteading or by purchasing land
49. Clinton, supra note 7, at 978.
50. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-58 (1970)).
51. 25 U.S.C. § 349(1970).
52. Id. § 348.
19771
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from individual tribal members.53 Subsequent assertions of jurisdic-
tion by these tribes over persons or property within their reserva-
tions has raised volatile problems.
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,11 reversed the assimila-
tion policy by emphasizing tribal self-government. Tribal constitu-
tions, councils and courts were authorized. Because this Act focused
upon improving the welfare of tribal members, most tribal constitu-
tions, adopted pursuant to the Reorganization Act, only address
jurisdiction of tribal members.55
The federal policy reverted to assimilation in the 1950's with
the passage of a series of termination acts. P.L. 280 was enacted
during this period.5" The most recent policy reversal came in the
1960's with the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.11 Its
passage heralded a return to the 1934 goals of improvement of reser-
vation life and tribal government. And, in the 1970's, a new phrase
- "self-determination" - entered the lexicon of Indian policy. 8
These pendulous reversals in federal Indian policy, together
with the evolution of the three categories of jurisdictional rules,
have resulted in "a complex labyrinth" of jurisdictional statutes,
decisions and policies, which many practitioners find virtually im-
possible to master.59 It is this legally complex and politically sensi-
tive area that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed in
Oliphant v. Schlie.
II. OLIPHANT V. SCHLIE
The facts of this case are of particular importance because the
alleged criminal act was directed against a tribal officer and because
it occurred when no other law enforcement officials were available.
At a tribal celebration, known as Chief Seattle Days, a large
number of people were camped at the Suquamish tribal camp-
grounds. In the early morning, a non-Indian, Mark Oliphant, was
arrested by tribal police and charged in tribal court with assaulting
53. Not all reservations were opened to homesteading by the Executive during the
tenure of the General Allotment Act.
54. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified in scattered sections of title 25
of the United States Code (1970)).
55. See, e.g., CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI OF THE FLATHEAD RESERVATION CONST.
art. VI, § 1, cl. 1.
56. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (current version in
scattered sections of titles 18 and 25 of the United States Code (1970).
57. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77-78 (pertinent provisions codi-
fied at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03, 1321-26 (1970)).
58. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975)
(codified in scattered sections of titles 25, 42, and 50 of the United States Code (1970)).
59. Clinton, supra note 7, at 991.
[Vol. 38
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an officer and resisting arrest. He was incarcerated in lieu of two
hundred dollars bail by order of tribal court, but later was released
on his own recognizance. Before trial he petitioned the federal dis-
trict court for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal court denied the
writ and Oliphant appealed. Thus, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals faced an issue which had not been raised since Ex Parte
Kenyon: 0
What is the jurisdiction of an Indian tribe over non-Indians who
commit crimes while on Indian tribal land within the boundaries
of the reservation?6'
In affirming the district court's denial of the writ of habeas
corpus, the Ninth Circuit held that the Suquamish Tribe had
criminal jurisdiction of Oliphant for the violation of tribal law.
Courts have previously based tribal jurisdiction to regulate the ac-
tivities of non-Indians on the reservations on federal statutes," but
neither the Supreme Court nor any federal circuit court until
Oliphant had based a finding of tribal criminal jurisdiction of non-
Indians primarily upon the inherent sovereignty of a tribe. In 1975
the Supreme Court, in United States v. Mazurie, 3 expressly re-
frained from deciding whether the independent authority of the
tribe was alone sufficient to sustain imposition of a tribal ordinance
on non-Indians within the Wind River Reservation. 4 In Mazurie,
the determination was unnecessary because a federal statute au-
thorized the tribe to regulate the sale of liquor on the reservation. 5
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in 1976, in Quechan Tribe of Indi-
ans v. Rowe," noted the tribe's claim of inherent authority to exer-
cise criminal jurisdiction over non-members of the tribe who vio-
lated tribal law. However, because the Quechan Constitution lim-
ited the tribe's jurisdiction to tribal members, the court found it
unnecessary to decide whether any congressional policy prohibits
the exercise of such jurisdiction. Thus, the court merely said,
"[T]he question remains unanswered.""
In Oliphant the court of appeals answered this question, at
least as it applied to the Suquamish Tribe in the State of Washing-
ton. The significance of Oliphant lies as much in its rationale as in
60. 14 F. Cas. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1878)(No. 7,720).
61. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975); United States v. Finch,
548 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1976).
63. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
64. Id. at 557.
65. Id.
66. 531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976).
67. Id. at 410 n. 3.
1977]
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its ultimate conclusion. The majority opinion and the dissent pres-
ent the two opposing lines of argument regarding Indian jurisdic-
tion. Since neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has resolved the
issue, it is important to examine the majority and dissenting opin-
ions.
A. Inherent Sovereignty
In determining whether the Suquamish had jurisdiction over
Oliphant, the majority said that the proper approach was to ask
"first, what the original sovereign powers of the tribe were, and,
then, how far and in what respects these powers have been lim-
ited."6 The phrasing of the issue is determinative, and defines the
opposing theoretical positions on the subject. That the choice of
approach is critical is illustrated by the fact that neither the major-
ity nor the dissent found any act of Congress which had expressly
granted criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to the tribe. The
majority reasoned that since Congress had not acted to limit the
inherent power of the tribe, the Suquamish still possessed the juris-
diction. Conversely, the dissent found the tribe to be without such
jurisdiction since Congress had not explicitly granted it.
The majority began its analysis with the following statement:
"It must always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were
once independent and sovereign nations . . .who, though con-
quered and dependent, retained those powers of autonomous states
that are neither inconsistent with their status nor expressly termi-
nated by Congress" (citations omitted)"9 Then the majority took
the critical step of stating that the ability to preserve order on the
reservation, including the punishing of those who violate tribal laws,
is, by definition, part of that original sovereignty.70 Recognizing that
this was a case of first impression,7 the court supported its state-
ment in two ways-by analogy to the tribal powers to tax and by
dicta from Williams v. Lee."2 The court analogized its statement to
an early Eighth Circuit decision which upheld the right of the Creek
Nation to tax non-Indians:
[The right to tax] was one of the inherent and essential attributes
of its original sovereignty. It was the natural right of that people,
indespensible to its autonomy as a distinct tribe or nation, and it
68. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976).
69. Id.
70. Id. for text of quote, see p. 339 supra.
71. Although the question was previously discussed in Ex Parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353
(W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7,720), the court found that the crime alleged in that case, if it
occurred at all, took place off the reservation.
72. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
[Vol. 38
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must remain an attribute of its government until by the agreement
of the nation itself or by the superior power of the republic it is
taken from it."
The court then cited dicta in Williams v. Lee,74 in which the Su-
preme Court recognized that Indian tribes have criminal jurisdic-
tion over crimes by or against Indians.75
Although not expressed by the court, the traditional common
law axiom that a crime constitutes an act against the sovereign
supports the majority's decision that the tribe's original sovereignty,
by definition, encompasses the power to prosecute those who violate
its criminal laws. This is the governmental interest upon which its
power to prosecute criminals is based. Thus, the majority opinion
is soundly based not only in the precepts of Indian law, but also in
the broader common law.
Starting from an entirely different premise, the dissent agreed
with the appellant, Oliphant, that the tribe did not have jurisdic-
tion because Congress had not conferred such authority upon the
tribe. The dissent argued that the "notion of tribal sovereignty
. . . is merely a veil used where the issue is, in fact, one of federal
preemption of regulation in the field of Indian affairs.""T The dis-
sent further contended that to resolve the instant question it was
necessary to find a congressional grant of such power to the tribes."
The dissent is implicitly based upon the premise that the tribe
no longer possesses whatever inherent powers it may have had as an
independent nation, prior to coming within the protective
jurisdiction of the United States.7" Thus, congressional enactments,
including treaties, are grants of powers or rights to the tribes. Ab-
sent such a statutory grant, the tribes do not possess the power.
With this premise, Judge Kennedy then reached the following con-
clusions about tribal sovereignty: the tribal sovereignty notion grew
out of cases dealing with state encroachment and simply are not
applicable to the subject of tribal jurisdiction over an individual;79
the power to prosecute non-members "is not essential to the tribe's
identity or its self-governing status" 0 and is not within the residual
73. Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599
(1906) (cited in Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F. 2d 1007, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 1976)).
74. 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
75. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1976). For the text of the Williams
dicta, see p. 343 supra.
76. Id. at 1015.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1009 n.i. See also Martone, American Indian Tribal Self-Government in the
Federal System: Inherent Right or Congressional License?, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 600 (1976).
79. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 1976).
80. Id.
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jurisdiction of the tribal courts."
The dissent's position on tribal sovereignty ignores a well set-
tled rule of Indian law which implicitly recognizes the original sover-
eignty of tribes, as well as the survival of remnants of that sover-
eignty. The rule holds that "treaties are not grants of rights to
Indians, but a grant of rights from them." 2 Rights not expressly
granted are reserved by the tribe. The majority opinion, which is in
accord with this rule, recognizes the continued sovereignty of Indian
tribes, interpreting congressional enactments not as grants of that
original power, but as limits upon it.3
B. Congressional Intent to Limit Tribal Sovereignty
With these mutually exclusive premises, both the majority and
the dissent analyzed the treaties and statutes applicable to the Su-
quamish. The majority examined the relevant treaties and acts of
Congress "to see if any [had] withdrawn from the Suquamish the
power to punish Oliphant for a violation of the tribal law and order
code. 8s4 The dissent, consistent with its premise that tribes have
only those remnants of their original sovereignty which Congress
expressly grants them, scrutinized the treaties and statutes for any
express grant of criminal jurisdiction. To appreciate the impact of
these contradictory premises upon the court's statutory interpreta-
tion, it is helpful to compare the analyses of the majority and dis-
sent.
Because the treaties between the United States and the Su-
quamish Tribe were silent on the subject of criminal jurisdiction,
the majority reasoned that the treaties could not deprive the Su-
quamish of such jurisdiction. 5 The dissent argued that "[s]uch
silence, if it imparts any information at all, must be understood in
light of the then prevailing policies, which do not appear to have
permitted jurisdiction by Indian tribes over non-Indians."8
The dissent's interpretation of the treaties ignored three basic
rules developed by the Supreme Court in construing treaties:
(1) ambiguous expressions are resolved in favor of the Indian
parties; (2) Indian treaties must be interpreted as the Indians
themselves would have understood them; and (3) Indian treaties
must be liberally construed in favor of Indians. 7
81. Id. at 1018.
82. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
83. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976).
84. Id. at 1010.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1016.
87. Wilkinson and Volkman, Judicial Review of Treaty Abrogation: "As Long As Water
[Vol. 38
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The majority's conclusion that silence could not be construed to
deprive the tribe of an original, inherent power is more congruous
with these rules. In fact, the majority prefaced its discussion of the
treaties by stating that it would be guided by the third rule listed
above. 8
The next step in the majority's analysis was consideration of
federal statutes regulating Indian affairs. The first statute ad-
dressed was the General Crimes Act.8" As noted in the introduction,
the 1834 reenactment of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act
formed the basis for this statute. The majority reviewed congres-
sional records to interpret this Act:
Our reading of the Congressional history convinces us that § 1152
was not intended, and should not be read, to prohibit Indian tribes
from prosecuting non-Indians for offenses against tribal law com-
mitted on the reservation. Section 1152 [The General Crimes Act]
can be explained more rationally as an attempt to protect Indian
tribes, who had no established legal system and whose authority
was frequently challenged by unsympathetic state governments,
see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, supra, from depredations by
'unprincipled white men.' H.R. Rep. No. 474, 23 Cong., 1st Sess.
98 (1834).-
The court then quoted from the 1834 House Report:
[I]t is rather of courtesy than of right that we undertake to punish
crimes committed in that territory by and against our own citizens.
And this provision of [§ 25 of the Trade and Intercourse Act of
1834] is retained principally on the ground that it may be unsafe
to trust to Indian law in the early stages of their government.'
This interpretation of the General Crimes Act is critical to the ma-
jority's finding that Congress had not withdrawn criminal jurisdic-
tion from the tribe. The General Crimes Act does confer jurisdiction
on the federal courts over crimes committed by non-Indians against
Indians on the reservations. Had the majority found that the con-
gressional intent was to confer exclusive jurisdiction, the dissent's
conclusion would have prevailed, despite the fact that the dissent's
premise was diametrically opposed to that of the majority. This
interpretation of the General Crimes Act was the second important
decision in Oliphant. The dissent interpreted this statute as mani-
Flows, Or Grass Grows Upon The Earth"-How Long A Time Is That?, 63 CAul'. L. Rxv.
601, 608-11 (1975). See also Lynaugh, supra note 6, at 68.
88. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1976).
89. For the text of the General Crimes Act, see p. 342 supra.
90. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 1976).
91. Id.
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festing Congress' intent to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon federal
courts. In finding concurrent jurisdiction, the majority broke with
over one-hundred years of practice.
Another federal statute briefly examined by both the majority
and the dissent was the Indian Civil Rights Act.2 The majority
concluded that contrary to Oliphant's argument, nothing in the
Indian Bill of Rights purported to withdraw any criminal jurisdic-
tion from the tribe . 3 The court said that the Indian Bill of Rights
"recognizes such [tribal] jurisdiction, but prescribes certain due
process type limitations upon its exercise."94 In contrast, the dissent
found that the Indian Civil Rights Act was intended to apply only
to "tribal courts in dealings with tribal members."95 And, therefore,
by inference, the Act showed that Congress did not recognize tribal
jurisdiction of non-Indians.
The dissent strongly argued that "[tihe current scheme for
dealing with offenses on Indian land is consistent with the premise
that Indian courts do not have jurisdiction of non-Indians."96 This
argument was persuasively supported by the contention that the
Federal Major Crimes Act deprives the tribe only of jurisdiction over
Indians who commit the enumerated major crimes. The dissent
pointed out that "[i]t seems extremely anomalous that Congress
would provide for exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts for major
crimes committed by Indians, but permit tribal courts to try non-
Indians for those same offenses." 97 On its face, it is indeed unlikely.
To resolve this issue raised by the dissent, it is helpful to recall that
the Major Crimes Act was a reaction to the Supreme Court holding
that the General Crimes Act deprived the federal courts of jurisdic-
tion to try an Indian for the murder of another Indian on the reserva-
tion.98 Congress was addressing a specific problem: an Indian mur-
derer unpunished because of lack of federal jurisdiction. As is usual
with ad hoc legislation, it failed to provide comprehensive regula-
tion. Additionally, Congress knew that if the murder had been com-
mitted by a non-Indian, the federal courts would have had jurisdic-
tion under the General Crimes Act, and, therefore, did not see the
need for addressing non-Indians. As suggested by the dissent, the
statutory scheme of the Major Crimes Act, supplemented by the
jurisdictional limitations imposed upon tribal courts by the Indian
92. 25 U.s.C. §§ 1301-03 (1970).
93. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 1976).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1016.
96. Id. at 1017.
97. Id. at 1018.
98. See discussion p. 340 supra.
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Bill of Rights,99 does support a conclusion that Congress does not
intend the tribes to have jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit
major crimes upon the reservation.
While the dissent drew strong inferences from the federal statu-
tory scheme,' the majority limited its inquiry to the detection of
express conflicts between tribal criminal jurisdiction and federal
policy. They concluded that not only is there no conflict but,
"[tlribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, as limited by the
Indian Bill of Rights, is a small but necessary part of this policy."','
C. Practical Considerations
The final argument of the court was that this case highlighted
the need for tribal jurisdiction over minor offenses, and demon-
strated the practicality and wisdom of such jurisdiction. Indeed,
this may be the key to the court's break with the one-hundred year
tradition of exclusive federal jurisdiction over non-Indian offend-
ers. 102
After noting the persistence of antagonisms between reserva-
tion Indians and the surrounding populations,'"' the court concluded
with an extensive and persuasive quote from the appellee's brief.
These paragraphs address the practical considerations which are
critical to the court's decision:
Federal law is not designed to cover the range of conduct normally
regulated by local governments. Minor offenses committed by non-
Indians within Indian reservations frequently go unpunished and
thus unregulated. Federal prosecutors are reluctant to institute
federal proceedings against non-Indians for minor offenses in
courts in which the dockets are already over-crowded, where litiga-
tion will involve burdensome travel to witnesses and investigative
personnel, and where the case will most probably result in a small
fine or perhaps in a suspended $entence. Prosecutors in counties
adjoining Indian reservations are reluctant to prosecute non-
Indians for minor offenses where limitations on state process make
witnesses difficult to obtain, where the jurisdictional division be-
tween federal, state and tribal governments over the offense is not
clear, and where the peace and dignity of the government affected
is not his own but that of the Indian tribe. Traffic offenses, tres-
99. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
100. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F. 2d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 1976).
101. Id. at 1012-13.
102. There were other indicators that the practice of the previous century was about to
change. Notable was the withdrawal in 1974 by the Solicitor General's Office of an opinion
that the tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction of non-Indians. Solic. Gen. Op. M. -36810
(Aug. 10, 1970), withdrawn, Solic. Gen. Memo (Jan. 25, 1974).
103. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 1976).
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passes, violations of tribal hunting and fishing regulations, disor-
derly conduct and even petty larcenies and simple assaults com-
mitted by non-Indians go unpunished. The dignity of the tribal
government suffers in the eyes of Indian and non-Indian alike, and
a tendency toward lawless behavior necessarily follows.,"4
The majority in Oliphant pointed to the facts as illustrative of
the need for tribal jurisdiction." 5 In planning for the tribal celebra-
tion, the Tribe knew thousands of people would congregate in a
small area near the tribal campgrounds. Both the local county law
enforcement officials and the Bureau of Indian Affairs were asked
to provide law enforcement assistance. The county provided only
one deputy for one eight-hour shift during the entire weekend. The
Bureau told the Tribe to provide their own law enforcement out of
tribal funds. Thus, the only law enforcement officials available at
the time Oliphant was arrested were tribal police. "Without the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribe and its courts, there could have
been no law enforcement whatsoever on the Reservation during this
major gathering which clearly created a potentially dangerous situa-
tion with regard to law enforcement.' '"0
III. CONCLUSION
After 170 years of federal court jurisdiction over non-Indians
who commit crimes against Indians on reservations, the Oliphant
decision formally recognized that this jurisdiction, granted by the
General Crimes Act, is not exclusive. The decision makes good
practical sense in terms of the federal judicial system, because it
functionally results in a division of criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians on the reservation which matches the current statutory
scheme for Indians: minor offenses are tried in tribal courts and
major crimes are tried in federal courts. As the Oliphant majority
noted, neither federal legislation, federal courts nor the federal
prosecutorial mechanism is designed to deal with these minor
offenses.107
The decision raises some questions. One such question, unan-
swered by the court, concerns the procedural protections available
to the non-Indian in tribal court. Will a non-Indian who is tried in
tribal court have the right to a jury panel which includes non-
Indians? When the provisions of the Indian Bill of Rights differ from
the federal constitutional guarantees, which will prevail when ap-
104. Id. at 1013-14.
105. Id. at 1013.
106. Id.
107. The Oliphant decision does not address the important interrelationships of tribal
jurisdiction with state jurisdiction.
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plied to the non-Indian? As demonstrated in Oliphant, the habeas
corpus proceeding in federal court is available to non-Indians, as
well as Indians,'"' who seek judicial protection of their rights. This
may allay the fear expressed by Oliphant of not receiving a fair trial
in tribal court. 0 9
Implicitly, the Oliphant decision recognizes the competence of
tribal courts to deal with minor offenses. Non-Indians are generally
unaware of the structure and procedures of tribal courts, and of the
content of tribal constitutions and law and order codes. Also largely
unnoticed by non-Indians is the judicial training program estab-
lished by the National American Indian Court Judges Association.
As a result of the Oliphant decision, other tribes will inevitably
begin to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians.10 In States with sig-
nificant reservation populations, this will focus increased attention
of non-Indians on the Indian courts, and, resultantly, produce a
clamor for change."' So long as only Indian people were tried in
these courts, they were of minimal interest to the majority of non-
Indian citizens.
Ultimately the decision as to Indian jurisdiction lies with Con-
gress. Three principal alternatives are available to Congress. First,
it could authorize States to exercise jurisdiction over reservations -
a return to the policies of the 1950's. Second, it could expand federal
law enforcement on the reservations-contrary to the Oliphant ra-
tionale. And, third, it could continue current policies of strengthen-
ing tribal governments, including tribal courts and law enforcement
agencies. Of the three options, the third is most consistent with the
original treaty commitments and with current policy. The first,
state assumption of jurisdiction, does the most violence to those
promises of a century ago. This alternative would be an unfortunate
relegation of the rights of this political minority, rights guaranteed
to them "for as long as water flows or grass grows upon the earth.""'
Since 1959, the trend in federal court decisions," 3 typified by
Oliphant, is consistent with the third alternative of strengthening
tribal governments. The time thus appears ripe for tribes to negoti-
108. See Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F. 2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
109. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 1976).
110. Indeed, some tribes have already moved to assert jurisdiction over non-Indians,
notably the Salt River and Gila River Pima Maricopa Indian Communities in the State of
Arizona, and the Quinault, Colville, and obviously, the Suquamish tribes in the State of
Washington. THE AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., MANUAL OF INDIAN LAw
D-12 n. 55 (1976).
111. The Billings Gazette, Mar. 6, 1977, at 1A, col. 1, and 1D.
112. Wilkinson and Volkman, supra note 87.
113. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), marks the beginning of this trend in federal
court decisions which generally give increased recognition to the rights of tribal government.
1977]
17
Mitchell: Oliphant v. Schlie: Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Of Non-Indians
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1977
356 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
ate with the States to attempt to resolve the plethora of problems
which flow from the presence of a semi-sovereign jurisdiction within
the borders of a sovereign State. Congressional approval can be
sought for negotiated settlements and the federal courts utilized as
the final arbiters. Such negotiation will not make the problems
easier to solve, but it will increase likelihood that the solutions will
maximize functional compatibility between state and tribal sover-
eignty, with the least possible aggravation to all concerned.
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 38 [1977], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/5
